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Title VII and Religious Discrimination: Is Any
Accommodation Reasonable Under the
Constitution?
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964' (the Act) to pro-
hibit various forms of racial discrimination throughout the nation.'
Specifically, Title VIP of the Act was designed to eliminate racial
discrimination in employment practices.' This Title also includes a
broad catch-all clause which prohibits employers or prospective
employers from basing employment or discharges of workers on reli-
gious beliefs.' However, by not defining "religion" ' in the original
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
2. The goal of the Civil Rights Act was to eliminate the "glaring ... discrimination
against Negroes which exists throughout our nation." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1963). See generally Symposium-1964 Civil Rights Act, Equal Employer Opportunity,
7 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 413 (1966).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. IV 1974).
4. See Note, Title VII-Religious Discrimination in Employment-Is "Effect on Individ-
ual Religious Belief" Discrimination Based on Religion Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964?,
16 WAYNE L. REV. 327 (1969).
5. There is little discussion at the Congressional hearings of considerations to include
religious discrimination within proscribed employment practices. This was not due to the
import of the topic, but was based on pragmatic reasons-there had been few, if any, com-
plaints brought to the attention of Congress and the problem did not seem to be pressing.
Father Cronin, representing the Catholic Church, stated the consensus opinion of the leaders
of various religious denominations who testified before the House committee: "I don't believe
that need of inserting religion under Title VII is very pressing at this time. There are remnants
of religious discrimination . . . but compared to the instant problem . . . of the civil rights
of the Negro community, these are very, very minor and peripheral . 110 CONG. REC.
1528-29 (1964).
Many Congressmen were skeptical of the need to include religion under Title VII, especially
since the prohibition was not based on any direct allegations or complaints, but was aimed
at a broad, all-encompassing prohibition of any discriminatory act which may have occurred
in the past.
Rep. Abernethy: Who were the people being discriminated against because of
religion, of what religious faith?
Rep. Celler: I do not think we had any evidence of religious discrimination
insofar as the Committee on the Judiciary is concerned that any particular sect or
religion has been discriminated against.
Rep. Abernethy: Was any religion at all mentioned by name?
Rep. Celler: There was religion mentioned. There was testimony.
Rep. Abernethy: I am not speaking in general terms-I am speaking of a spe-
cific religion.
Rep. Celler: No, there was not.
110 CONG. REc. 1528 (1964).
6. It was not until 1972 that an amendment was added to §701 of the Act defining religion
to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's, or a
prospective employee's religious observances or practices without undue hardship on the
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enactment and by failing to promulgate guidelines to determine
religious discrimination until 1966, 7 congressional action indicated
that this proscription was added as an afterthought.
Regardless of whether or not religious discrimination was a catal-
ytic force behind the Act, it remained uncertain how pervasive the
legislation would be. Under the original guidelines an employer was
permitted to establish a normal work schedule, affecting all workers
equally, regardless of whether or not the schedule infringed upon the
religious observances of some employees. Intentional discrimination
was obviously prohibited under both the Act and these guidelines,8
but where unintentional discrimination resulted from seemingly
normal work schedules,9 courts invoked the statute without exami-
nation to see if any legitimate basis could support the schedule.'
New guidelines were enacted in 1967" and were incorporated into
conduct of the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(j) (Supp. IV 1974). See also text
accompanying notes 90-93 and notes 120-29 infra.
7. The 1966 guidelines state in pertinent part:
[Tihe duty not to discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation on the
part of the employer to accommodate to the reasonable religious needs of employees
and . . . prospective employees where such accommodation can be made without
serious inconvenience to the conduct of the business. However, . . . an employer
is free under Title VII to establish a normal workweek generally applicable to all
employees, notwithstanding that this schedule may not operate with uniformity in
its effect upon the religious observances of his employees.
31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
8. See the remarks of Senator Humphrey at 110 CONG. Rc. 12, 723-24. At the Senate
hearings Humphrey stated "The express requirement of intent is designed to make it wholly
clear that inadvertent or accidental discrimination will not violate the title . . . the respon-
dent must have intended to discriminate." 110 CONG. REC. 12,724. See also Edwards and
Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L.
REv. 599 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Edwards and Kaplan); cf., Blumrosen, Strangers in
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Blumrosen]. See also text accompanying
notes 128-32 infra.
9. Compare Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) with Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544
(6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) and Hardison v. Trans
World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975). In Dewey, the court recognized that some prac-
tices, while perhaps discriminatory in effect, are not intentional and held that the employer
should not be penalized for any and all unusual beliefs of employees which serve to disrupt
normal and accepted business practices and work schedules. This is consistent with the
remarks of Sen. Humphrey before the Senate committee, note 8 supra. In both Cummins and
Hardison this theory was not applied. There, discrimination in effect was prima facie evi-
dence of intentional discrimination and any damage to the employer's business was inciden-
tal. Since Dewey was decided prior to the 1972 amendment and at a time when the original
guidelines were effective, the decisions can be reconciled as following the law in existence at
the time the controversy arose.
10. See text accompanying notes 50 through 57 infra.
11. The new regulations differed from the old in one very important respect-they com-
pelled the employer to accommodate religious beliefs in virtually every circumstance. The
1967 guidelines state, in pertinent part:
19781 Religious Discrimination 415
the Act by amendment in 1972.12 Under the amended provisions an
employer is required to make a "reasonable accommodation"'" to
the "religious beliefs"'" of all employees or prospective employees
unless such accommodation would inflict an undue hardship upon
the employer's business. Because these new guidelines favor minor-
ity religions,'5 particularly Sabbatarian faiths which proscribe
members.from working Saturdays, employers claim that the provi-
sion is violative of the establishment clause of the Constitution
which states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds
• ..includes an obligation on the part of the employer to make reasonable accom-
modations to the religious needs of employees and prospective employees where
such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business. Such undue hardship .. .may exist where the employee's
needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially similar
qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.
29 C.F.R. §1605.1(b) (1975). The purpose for changing the language of the guidelines was the
decision in Dewey and Congressional intent to prevent such a ruling in the future. 118 CONG.
REc. 7167 (1972).
12. 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
13. Congress did not define "reasonable accommodation" in the amendment. Further-
more, only one example of an undue hardship was provided where the employee's work is
needed and cannot readily be completed by another worker. As noted in Hardison, this
example was not meant to be exhaustive. 97 S. Ct. 2264, 2271 n.7 (1977). Judicial determina-
tion of the parameters of the phrase has led to extensive litigation as to what amount of
accommodation, if any, is reasonable. See, e.g., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544
(6th Cir. 1975). The litigation culminated recently in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 97
S. Ct. 2264 (1977), where the Supreme Court delimited the term somewhat. The Court
articulated that an employer is not required to breach a collective bargaining agreement with
a union in order to appease the claims of one employee, but did not go so far as to define the
boundaries of reasonable accommodation. Id.
14. See note 6 supra. For a compilation of various factual settings which have been
claimed to be within the provision, see Note, Accommodation of an Employee's Religious
Practices Under Title VII, 1976 U. ILL. L. FORUM 867.
15. Indeed, Senator Jennings Randolph of West Virginia, the sponsor of the amendment
and himself a Sabbatarian, when speaking before the Senate, noted that only a few religions
would be affected by the addition. He specifically mentioned Orthodox Jews, Seventh Day
Adventists and Seventh Day Baptists, while stating there may be a few others. He opined
that the amendment would affect a total of about 1.25 million members of the American work
force who observe Saturday as the Sabbath. 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972). He did not, however,
declare what portion of this figure, if any, had actually experienced inconvenience or discrimi-
natory practices due to their religious beliefs. Rather, his calculations were based upon the
estimated number of Sabbatarians throughout the nation. Id.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. 1. The amendment reads, in full: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
Constitutional claims were raised in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir.
1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.,
516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Reid v.
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When faced with establishment clause attacks in the areas of
education and Sunday closing laws, the Supreme Court has devel-
oped and applied a tripartite test. 7 To pass constitutional muster,
a statute must: (1) reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose; 8 (2)
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;"
and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.2 "
Failure to meet any standard will render the statute unconstitu-
tional .2
This article examines the basis and evolution of each criterion
and its application to the religious discrimination clause of Title
VII. By applying the tripartite test to the religious discrimination
clause of Title VII, the article will demonstrate that the reasonable
accommodation-undue hardship demand of Title VII is clearly vio-
lative of the Establishment Clause.
SECULAR LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE
Elements Considered by the Courts
The establishment clause unequivocally prohibits .any govern-
mental action either fostering or subsidizing any religious belief.2
The groundwork for this prohibition is traceable to colonial times
prior to the adoption and ratification of the Constitution. In Everson
v. Board of Education, Justice Black set out the history and ration-
ale of the clause. He traced the plight of the early settlers who came
to America to escape religious persecution in Europe. Once in the
new world, many of the previously persecuted settlers soon became
persecutors imposing their religious beliefs upon all who came to
their colony and exacting harsh penalties upon non-conformers. 4
When it came time to draft and ratify the Constitution, Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison strove to protect individual beliefs
from any form of government intrusion. 5 Madison's Memorial and
Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); and Hardison v. Trans World Airlines,
527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion on the constitu-
tional claim, although appellate courts dismissed the challenge in Cummings and Hardison.
17. See notes 23-46 infra and accompanying text.
18. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
19. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961).
20. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). The tripartite test was first enunciated in
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
21. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
22. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 8-13, 34-35.
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Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 26 originally written in
opposition to a tax imposed by Virginia to support churches, also
served as the keystone in the struggle to ratify the religious protec-
tion clauses of the first amendment.27 The crux of Madison's argu-
ment was man's inalienable right to believe in the faith of his
choice, completely free from legislative interference. He argued that
by requiring a citizen to contribute even three pence to support any
religion under governmental direction was an impermissible foster-
ing of religion.,
Once enacted, the establishment clause and Madison's theories
were unchallenged until the twentieth century when disputes arose
centering on two areas, education 9 and Sunday closing laws.30 The
result of these challenges was the development of a sliding scale
examination based on the proposition that the first amendment
minimally requires that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Govern-
ment can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."',
This examination initially considers whether a public benefit is
involved. Moreover, any benefit to religion must undergo a direct-
indirect scrutiny to determine the constitutionality of the statute.
For example, in those cases dealing with various state procedures
conferring benefits on private schools, the Court has consistently
determined the beneficiaries of the legislation. Where the public at
large is the intended and direct beneficiary, the state action has
gained approval even though some religion may benefit indirectly.2
Similarly, in the Sunday closing law cases the Court has upheld the
statutes because the general public again benefits the most. By
establishing a uniform day of rest, on which all stores must close,
26. See the Appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion in Everson which sets out
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments in full. 330 U.S. at
63-72.
27. Id. at 39-43.
28. Id. at 34-35.
29. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
30. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc.
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
31. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
32. When children are provided transportation to and from school, Everson v. Board of
Educ. 330 U.S. 1 (1947), or given schoolbooks for classroom study, Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968), the benefit is balancing the right of providing education to all students
in order to avoid overburdening the public school system which would be unable to cope with
the number of students if private schools closed.
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the state is providing a means whereby the public health is pre-
served, leading to a more fruitful society.3
The public benefit theory is not without limit; countervailing
factors must also be considered. Although the general public may
benefit from legislation, state enactments providing a directly bene-
ficial or preferential treatment to one or all religions and which are
only indirectly or secondarily beneficial to the society as a whole will
violate the Constitution." Often, this determination has been made
by looking to legislative purpose.
Everson v. Board of Education5 was the first Supreme Court
decision examining a state statute to discern whether there was a
proper legislative purpose sufficient to overcome an establishment
clause challenge. In Everson the New Jersey legislature had enacted
a provision authorizing local school boards to reimburse parents of
non-public school children for transportation costs incurred in bus-
ing their children to private schools. 8 Upholding the statute, the
Court recognized that the state had a proper, secular interest in
promoting education. Furthermore, despite the fact that the chil-
dren attended predominantly Catholic schools, the legislation was
religiously neutral, merely providing a means whereby parents
could send their children "safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools. ' 37
33. An anomalous pre-Title VII case was Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Al-
though this case did not deal with education or Sunday closing laws, it may have been the
percursor of religious discrimination cases. Again the Court espoused a public benefit theory
upholding an individual's right to entertain religious beliefs apart from governmental intru-
sion or coercion. The Court noted that where a direct public benefit inures to the society as
a whole, individual benefits may not be compromised by the state legislation. In Verner a
South Carolina welfare agency was brought to court for failure to pay an individual who was
unemployed. The state claimed the refusal to pay was justifiable on grounds that the individ-
ual would not seek employment; therefore, under state law, welfare payments could properly
be withheld. The Court held that a person could not be forced to accept a job which would
cause her to violate her religious beliefs in order to qualify for welfare benefits. In striking
down the application of the statute, the Court again focused on the public benefit theory
similar to that expounded in the Sunday closing law cases. Id.
34. Application of the sliding scale examination resulted in findings of establishment
clause violations where public school facilities were used for parochial education, Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); and where parochial school teachers
were subsidized by tax revenues, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). However, no
violation was found where private schools received books from local government agencies,
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), and where children received reimbursement
for transportation expenses, Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), and where govern-
ment funds were provided to religiously operated universities in order to construct classroom
facilities, Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972).
35. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 23.
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Everson does not suggest, however, that a state may enact legisla-
tion which serves to benefit religion, albeit indirectly, under the
guise of educational benefits. A distinction must be drawn where the
state undertakes some overt action involving close cooperation of a
state and religious institution. In such a case, a proper purpose may
be invalidated on grounds that the government action is benign. For
example, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,18 de-
cided a year after Everson, the Court invalidated an Illinois law
which permitted the use of public school facilities for religious in-
struction." The principal factor distinguishing McCollum from
Everson was that the Illinois law fostered religion by permitting the
state's compulsory public school machinery to aid religious instruc-
tion, whereas the New Jersey statute employed a purely secular
means of providing education. Thus, in McCollum there was no
direct public benefit with a tangential effect on a religious institu-
tion, but rather a direct benefit to certain parochial schools at the
expense of the general public.
Underlying these decisions is the notion that to withstand an
establishment clause challenge, legislation must not intend to or
actually benefit any religion directly. Where the purpose is truly
secular, such as promoting education, any benefit must be tangen-
tial and brought about through attempted government neutrality or
the purpose will be invalid.40 An impermissible purpose was found
in Engel v. Vitale4 where a New York law authorized the reading
of a non-denominational prayer at the beginnng of public school
classes despite the fact that participation in the recitation of the
prayer was voluntary. 2 The Court reasoned that the law served to
coerce non-believers or atheistic children to a particular belief and
that such action violated the neutrality imposed under the Consti-
tution. Even when cloaked with a legitimate and secular purpose
such as promoting education, the law violated the Constitution
since it had a direct effect and an improper purpose.43 While it is
arguable that prayer-reading is a valuable learning experience that
38. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
39. Id. Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). In Zorach the Court upheld a
statute very similar to that struck down in McCollum. The difference between the two laws
was that Illinois allowed parochial instruction to be held on public school grounds, while New
York only provided for an early release of students so that children whose parents so desired
could attend religious instruction at parochial schools.
40. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Abington School of Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963).
41. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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exposes the pupils to various beliefs and spurs religious tolerance,
the direct effect does not promote constitutional objectives. Prayer-
reading can have a coercive effect; such coercion does not work for
society's benefit. Therefore, the statute must fall under the first
amendment."
The secular purpose criterion was expanded in cases which dealt
with Sunday closing laws.45 In both McGowan v. Maryland" and
Braunfeld v. Brown,47 public welfare considerations served to over-
come statutory deficiencies even though the result was an indirect
benefit to some religions. In both cases Sabbatarian merchants
claimed that Sunday closing laws violated their first amendment
rights because, as non-Christians, they observe Saturday as a day
of rest.48 Rejecting these constitutional claims, the Court held that
the purpose of the state legislature was to provide a uniform day of
rest for all citizens. This entailed legitimate concerns promoting the
health and safety of the general public."5 The fact that the legisla-
tures chose Sunday, a day of particular significance for Christian
sects, was deemed irrelevant in comparison to the secular purpose
involved. 0 Again, religions benefited only secondarily, while the
general public was the primary beneficiary.
Application of the Criterion to Title VII
The original provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were passed
to assure equal treatment for all citizens." Employment guidelines
promulgated in 1966 were consistent with this concept. 52 They set
forth requirements designed to avoid discrimination in employment
practices, while permitting employers to establish work schedules
suitable to the needs of the business. 3 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,54
the Court examined the context and purpose of Title VII. Although
44. See notes 73-103 infra and accompanying text.
45. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961);
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
46. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
47. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
48. Both cases dealt with allegations by Orthodox Jews that Sunday closing laws in the
respective states inhibited their freedom of religion and served to impermissibly benefit
Christian merchants. The Court noted in McGowan that only economic injury was claimed
and held that injury was insufficient when challenging a law on first amendment grounds.
Moreover, in Braunfeld the Court mentioned the legitimate state interest involved in protect-
ing the health of its citizens by providing for a uniform day of rest.
49. 366 U.S. at 431, 607.
50. Id.
51. 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964).
52. For the pertinent language of the original guidelines see note 7 supra.
53. 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
54. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the Court was concerned with racial discrimination, Chief Justice
Burger was clear in his interpretation of the Act when he stated:
Congress did not intend by Title VII . . . to guarantee a job to
every person regardless of qualifications . . . .Discriminatory
preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and
only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate
on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification .... 11
Justice Burger held further that, "Congress had made [job] qualifi-
cations the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality, and
sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is that any
tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person
in the abstract. '56
The original guidelines dealing with religious discrimination were
consistent with both statements. The duty placed on the employer
was to treat all employees equally, without overt or subtle prefer-
ence for the religious beliefs of any group of workers. When the Act
was amended in 1972, and the language of the guidelines broadened,
the employer became obligated to make "exceptions" for certain
employees-those whose religious beliefs demanded work schedules
different from the general work force7.5
The 1972 amendment was designed to supplement the Act and
embody judicial interpretations of the 1967 guidelines.5, Laudable
as this goal may be, the purpose and effect run counter to the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the Act set forth in Griggs; for courts
have not applied the "business necessity" test in religious discrimi-
nation cases. 9 Both the 1967 guidelines and the 1972 amendment
require an overt preference for the religious beliefs of certain em-
ployees and dictate that an employer must go out of his way to
accommodate minority beliefs, even if such accommodation is detri-
mental to other employees.'" When ruling on constitutional chal-
55. Id. at 430-31.
56. Id. at 436.
57. For the pertinent language of the amendment see note 6 supra.
58. The guidelines were amended specifically in response to the Dewey decision. 118
CONG. REc. 7167 (1972). See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264, 2272 n.9
(1977).
59. 401 U.S. at 431. The Court held that, "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimina-
tion but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone
is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot
be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id.
60. It is necessary to examine the criteria utilized by courts in determining when there is
religious discrimination. The most critical factor is the nature of the employee's position in
conjunction with the work force available to the employer. If the individual's job is highly
19781
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lenges, courts have recurrently dissociated religious discrimination
charges, unlike other suspect employment practices,"' from any
claim or nexus with the business necessity test"2 and have not con-
sidered whether any legitimate public welfare or health and safety
specialized or unique, a discharge for refusing to work certain times is permissible. Reid v.
Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 315 (D.C.S.C. 1973). If the job requires little or no special skill, or if
the work force available to the employer is such that other employees could easily substitute
for the Sabbatarian worker, courts have found a violation of Title VII. Claybaugh v. Pacific
Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1 (D.C. Ore. 1973); Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. 385 F. Supp.
1382 (D.C. Neb. 1972). Even in situations where the employee maintains a highly specialized
position, if there is a sufficient number of employees equally capable of substituting for the
discharged person, any discharge in connection with one's religious beliefs is prohibited.
However, if there is a collective bargaining agreement involved, the employer may rely on it
to limit the amount of accommodation required of him. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,
97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
Transferring employees from one position to another is one alternative accommodation that
has been attempted in some cases. Problems arise, however, and the accommodation is
deemed inappropriate if the transfer results in monetary loss either to the individual, as in
Dixon v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D.C. Neb. 1972), or to the employer.
In Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), the court held that a
replacement for Reid on Saturdays would be an undue hardship since it would cost the
employer $77 per week extra in salary. In contrast, the Court of Appeals in Hardison v. Trans
World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), stated that some monetary loss to the employer
does not necessarily result in an undue hardship. Id. at 40. This problem was sidestepped for
the most part by the Supreme Court in Hardison, although the opinion mentions that mone-
tary claims may supply the basis for a constitutional challenge. See notes 148-49 and accom-
panying text.
Another consideration is whether the transferred employee is still being used to his fullest
capabilities and qualifications. Draper v. United States Pipe and Foundry, 527 F.2d 515 (6th
Cir. 1975); Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Co., 397 F. Supp. 375 (W.D. Pa. 1975). Morale
problems of other employees is yet another consideration. In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971), the Sixth
Circuit found that the imposition placed upon other employees in covering for Dewey posed
an undue hardship, at least under the original guidelines. Since Dewey, courts have looked
upon morale problems as just another element in determining undue hardship, and this
criteria is not as determinative as Dewey might have originally indicated. See, e.g., Draper
v. United States Pipe and Foundry, 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Reid v. Memphis Publishing
Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37
(N.D. Fla. 1973). In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), the court went so far as to say that morale problems
would be a plausible defense only where "chaotic personnel problems" arose. Id. at 550.
61. See. e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (racial discrimination);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (sex discrimination); Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (age discrimination).
62. The language of the test is set out at note 59 supra. Although business necessity was
the key factor in Griggs, cases dealing with religious discrimination allegations have not
focussed on the necessity test. Instead, courts have centered their attention on whether the
individual's religious beliefs are threatened by loss of employment. Compare Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33
(8th Cir. 1975) with Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Johnson
v. United States Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
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considerations are involved.3 If either theory was applied to reli-
gious discrimination allegations, the statute would fail the criteria
of Griggs. When the business necessity test was mentioned in Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison,"4 the Court simply noted that the
amendment did provide for permissible discharges in some situa-
tions.
In the Senate discussions prior to the passage of the 1972 amend-
ment, no legitimate secular purpose for the legislation was ex-
pressed or intimated. Indeed, Senator Jennings Randolph of West
Virginia, the sponsor of the amendment and himself a Sabbatarian,
stated that his purpose in sponsoring the amendment was to assure
increased religious attendance by those whose religious beliefs pro-
hibited work on certain days. Randolph made no mention of any
business necessity exceptions to the application of the provision.
Moreover, no benefit to the general public was proffered. The intent
was unequivocal when he noted:
[TIhere has been a partial refusal at times on the part of employ-
ers to hire or continue in employment employees whose religious
practices rigidly require them to abstain from work in the nature
of hire on particular days. So there has been . . . a dwindling of
the membership of some religious organizations because of the
situation .... 65
The reason for Randolph's support for the amendment was reiter-
ated later in a discussion before the Senate when he referred to
statements made by his pastor." These remarks apparently served
as the real catalyst for the amendment.
Clearly then, this legislation cannot be rationalized as being con-
sistent with those purposes enumerated in Everson v. Board of
Education" or McGowan v. Maryland." No considerations of the
health and safety of Sabbatarians were advanced and no indication
was made to justify the proposal as anything but purely sectarian.
63. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
64. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
65. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972).
66. Id. Indeed, Senator Randolph admitted his amendment was spurred by his pastor
when he stated:
My own Pastor in this area, Rev. Delmer Van Horn, has expressed his concern and
distress that there are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially
with younger people, and understandably so, with reference of a possible inability
of employers on some occasions to adjust work schedules to fit the requirements of
the faiths of some of their workers.
Id.
67. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
68. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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Given the nature of the amendment and the fact that the legislation
was enacted after Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 9 it is most presump-
tuous for courts to assume such a legislative purpose existed where
none was articulated. There simply is no inherent policy in uphold-
ing statutes giving preference to one religion over another, albeit
indirectly, absent those recognized in the areas of education or
Sunday closing laws.7" This has been the mainstay of establish-
ment clause cases since Everson. Because no prevailing or proposed
secular legislative purpose can be found to underlie the 1972 amend-
ment, the first element of the establishment clause test has not been
met.
PRIMARY EFFECT
Even where a proper secular purpose is present, a statute must
not have a primary or principal effect that either advances or inhib-
its religion.7' Again the Court walks a fine line in distinguishing
violations of the establishment clause when challenges to the pri-
mary effect of a statute are raised.
In Board of Education v. Allen,72 the Court noted that there may
be a separation of religious and secular functions, as where text-
books are provided to children in non-public schools.7 3 Recognition
of these separate functions permitted New York school boards to
furnish, free of charge, purely secular textbooks to parochial school
children. The Court emphasized that the state was effectuating a
legitimate, secular state interest in providing educational materials
and further emphasized that textbooks were critical to the teaching
process.74 The weight given by the Court to the secular purpose of
the legislature and the resultant effect on religious institutions was
similar to that found in Everson. In both cases parents of parochial
school children indirectly benefited through state aid. Thus, a sec-
ondary benefit inured to the various religions involved.75 Examining
69. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
70. See Edwards and Kaplan, note 8 supra, and Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise
Clause, 83 Hsav. L. REv. 327 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as Clark].
71. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
72. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
73. Id. at 240.
74. Id. at 246.
75. The distinction to be drawn here is that unlike cases such as Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); and Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the religious denomination itself does not benefit di-
rectly. Rather, the parents of children here are aided by a partial alleviation of the burden of
paying for private schools. Any benefit received by the denomination is incidental and en-
tirely dependent on the amount the parents return to the church through contributions, with
no requirement that they return anything at all. See generally Clark, supra note 70.
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the religious discrimination clause in this regard, it cannot be said
that Sabbatarian beliefs benefit only indirectly. Prior to Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison,7" courts have suggested that employers
must breach union contracts to accommodate Sabbatarians. Even
after Hardison it seems that anything short of breaking a collective
bargaining agreement can be required.77 At least one court has ex-
pressly recognized and stated a direct benefit to Sabbatarian beliefs
contrary to the neutrality required under the first amendment."
Neutrality in effect was further stressed in Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp.78 There the Court rejected a Pennsylvania law
which provided for daily Bible readings, without religious comment,
in public schools. The Court held that the neutrality requirement
would not tolerate official government sanction of religious tenets,
whether supportive of any one or of all orthodoxies.'" By permitting
Bible readings, the state fostered religious exercises in violation of
the constitutional rights of those of other faiths or those who were
atheists.8" The distinction to be drawn from Allen is that religious
readings of any nature, unlike textbooks, cannot be dissociated from
religious connotations. Because any religious readings, whether non-
denominational or eclectic, serve to promote religion in general, the
readings serve an impermissible function in light of first amend-
ment prohibitions. The primary fear was that atheistic children or
non-believers would be subjected to governmental approval of cer-
tain religious activities; such tacit approval serves to coerce non-
observing individuals to accept the beliefs of some religion approved
by the school board. 2 Neutrality, said the Court, was essential."
If religious discrimination in employment cases were examined in
light of Allen, the 1972 provision of Title VII would fall. Coercion
in the Bible reading cases is subtle, since the state attempts to
demonstrate neutrality by having readings of various religious be-
liefs. However, Title VII is overtly coercive, since workers may con-
vert to Sabbatarian beliefs in order to obtain a better working
76. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
77. Id. at 2271 n.7.
78. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
79. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Neutrality is not to be confused
with hostility for religions for that too is proscribed by the first amendment. Board of Educ.
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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schedule."4 Indicative of this contention is Trans World Airlines v.
Hardison.5 In that case a worker voluntarily changed positions
within the same company and invoked Title VII when his seniority
rights also changed. Hardison was aware that by requesting a new
position his seniority privileges would also be curtailed. Neverthe-
less, he sought to acquire rights superior to workers with more sen-
iority by bringing an action under the religious discrimination
clause.
The Supreme Court has said in reference to neutrality: "[Tihe
Establishment Clause prohibits [the] government from abandon-
ing secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion,
or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or reli-
gious organization." 6 This statement has either been overlooked or
completely ignored in religious discrimination cases, for advantages
accruing to Sabbatarians in light of the 1972 amendment to Title
VII have been recognized but discarded by the courts. In Cummings
v. Parker Seal Co., 7 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that the amendment only served to "put teeth in the pro-
hibition of religious discrimination,"8 thereby dismissing the con-
stitutional challenge. The actual effect of the amendment, however,
and the effect apparently contemplated by Senator Randolph, is a
preconceived and direct benefit to Sabbatarian religions. 8
Justice Phillips, speaking for the Sixth Circuit in Cummins,
stated: "It cannot be denied that some religious institutions will
derive incidental benefits from [the religious discrimination provi-
sions]. For example, churches holding services on Saturday may
enjoy a somewhat larger attendance with a correspondingly fuller
collection plate." 0 Despite the rationalization of the court in
Cummins, this benefit differed from that in Allen where the effect
was incidental. The purpose of the 1972 amendment and the logical
result of permitting a Sabbatarian to take certain days off is to
assure compliance with the worker's religious beliefs, with a corre-
sponding sanction of those religions.
In Cummins, the court ignored the warning in Gillette v. United
States' and misapplied the establishment clause test by declaring,
84. This theory is suggested although none of the cases examined in preparation for this
article challenged the sincerity of the beliefs of self-proclaimed Sabbatarians.
85. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
86. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
87. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
88: Id. at 552.
89. See remarks of Senator Randolph before the Senate at 118 CONG. Rc. 705-31 (1972).
90. 516 F.2d at 553.
91. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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"[Tihe statute and regulation are applicable to all members of all
religious faiths who observe Saturday as the Sabbath.""2 The error
of this logic is the comparison to determine whether one Sabba-
tarian belief is preferred over another. However, the test put forth
in Gillette stated that no imprimatur be placed on any religion
whatsoever. While the Sixth Circuit recognized beneficial treatment
to Sabbatarian beliefs at the expense of all other beliefs, no violation
of the Constitution was found.
The preferred standard should reject any involvement of religious
groups and secular purposes, especially where the involvement
would encroach upon another's religious liberties. This standard is
not met by Title VII demands. Those workers most damaged are
atheists. Conceivably, Christian workers could raise the provision to
escape working on Sundays, but atheists may not avail themselves
of the amendment at all. Because non-believers are disadvantaged,
and only a small number of religious groups are actually benefited,
the statute should be declared unconstitutional as fostering reli-
gious beliefs. 3
Title VII, as it now stands, fosters Sabbatarian beliefs by requir-
ing an employer to accommodate all religious observances and prac-
tices of his employees, save in exceptional circumstances where ac-
commodation would work an undue hardship upon the business."
In application, an undue hardship has been found only in rare in-
stances where the individual's job was unique" or where the avail-
able work force was so small that any rescheduling proved unreason-
able." Unlike cases involving Sunday closing laws, there is no public
benefit in these situations. Nor have any arguments been advanced
that there can be a proper division of religious and secular purposes,
92. 516 F.2d at 553 (emphasis by the court).
93. Based on United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970), an atheist ought to be afforded the same protection as those who hold
religious beliefs. Yet this is rarely the case. There has been only one case which has allowed
an atheist to avail herself of the amendment. In Young v. Southwestern Say. and Loan, 509
F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975), an atheist was held to be constructively discharged for failing to
attend monthly meetings as required by her employer. The reason she did not attend was
because the meetings always began with a prayer and the employer refused to permit her to
arrive late. This case is an anomaly and unlikely to occur often. The primary purpose of the
amendment was to aid Sabbatarian beliefs and to date that has been its overwhelming use.
94. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975). For a discussion on
Reid and its impact in the area of religious discrimination, see Comment, Title VI-Sabbath
Observer Discrimination-Reasonable Accommodation-Undue Hardship Stan-
dard-Establishment Clause-Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 22 N.Y.L.S.L. REV. 143
(1976).
95. Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Roberts v. Hermitage
Cotton Mills, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 315 (D.C.S.C. 1973).
96. Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973).
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as there has been in education cases.
Like the circumstances in A bington School District v. Schempp,7
the burden placed on employers by virtue of the reasonable accom-
modation clause of Title VII violates the constitutional rights of
others who do not ascribe to Sabbatarian observances." Those who
are non-Sabbatarian believers can be called upon to replace a Sab-
batarian worker, and must be called upon if the employer is to raise
a defense of attempted accommodation. This duty also violates the
doctrine of Gillette v. United States" because the government is
sanctioning those religions which demand that followers not work
certain days or hours.
An additional benefit accrues directly to the religion itself in that
higher attendance at services is presupposed, 10 as is a corresponding
increase in the collection plate.' Thus, the obvious, primary, and
direct effect of the reasonable accommodation clause advances the
beliefs of several religions. In so doing, Title VII violates the neutral-
ity test set forth by the Supreme Court.
EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT
The final criterion to be overcome in establishment clause chal-
lenges is that the statute must not involve excessive government
entanglement with religion. 02 This test has evolved primarily from
cases dealing with government grants to educational facilities.03
97. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
98. In Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), the court noted that
"before an employer can assert the defense of non-cooperation, it is incumbent upon it to
establish the accommodation which it has tendered and with which the employee has refused
to cooperate." Id. at 39. This differs from the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit in Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976). In Cummins it was held that the employer had accommodated Cummins for over a
year prior to discharge, thereby estopping the company from raising an undue hardship
defense. The results of these two cases place an employer in a very tenuous position. The
employer must decide at the outset of a religious discrimination charge whether or not to
attempt to accommodate. Regardless of whether he chooses to attempt accommodation or
not, he could be in violation of Title VII. If the employer decides that any accommodation
would work an undue hardship on the business, a prima facie case of discrimination is
presented under Hardison and he cannot raise the defense of employee non-cooperation. If,
on the other hand, he chooses to try to accommodate the worker, the employer may be barred
from later claiming any undue hardship exists. The question has become one of mixing fact
and law, determinable only by looking at the precise set of facts involved.
99. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
100. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 1975).
101. Id.
102. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
103. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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Public policy and a balancing of the degree of government interac-
tion are the crucial standards. As the Court stated in Walz v. Tax
Commission:'4
The question is inescapably one of degree .... The statute in-
volved necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit
and also gives rise to some . . . involvement .... In analyzing
either alternative the questions are whether the involvement is
excessive and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and
continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of en-
tanglement.10'
This test was propounded when the Court considered a challenge
to a state statute granting a tax exemption for churches. It recog-
nized the impossibility of constructing a wall totally separating all
functions of the church and state.06 Some government involvement
is essential, for example, where police or fire protection is af-
forded.'"' This inseparability of state involvement permits a legisla-
ture to define what should be included in determining taxable prop-
erty; the legislature may exempt certain properties which are used
solely for religious purposes. Thus, the Court in Walz opted to up-
hold the exemption privilege on the grounds that it constituted a
lesser government entanglement than no exemption. Likewise, en-
tanglement was deemed not to be excessive in providing religiously
operated universities with construction grants to be used exclusively
for educational purposes.'"8 The reasoning of the Court in school
construction cases was based on the theory that the construction
grant was a one-time, single-purpose loan entailing no continuing
governmental involvement. 0°
Analysis of permissible state interest cases and excessive entan-
glement decisions reveals that government intervention is imper-
missible where continual and burdensome imspection by a govern-
ment agency results."0 In Lemon v. Kurtzman,"' the Court invali-
dated a state statute which authorized payment of supplemental
income to non-public school teachers. The Court pointed out that
104. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
105. Id. at 674-75.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
109. Id. In Tilton the Court rejected the argument that an impermissible entanglement
would ensue since continuous inspection would be required to assure no sectarian use was
made of the buildings.
110. Compare Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
111. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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teachers, unlike schoolbooks, cannot be inspected once to determine
the extent and intent of secularization, nor could there be assur-
ances of compliance with established limitations."' The same con-
cept was followed in Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist"I and Meek v. Pittinger.'" The statute chal-
lenged in Nyquist was similar to that invalidated in Kurtzman, and
the Court had little trouble in again denying subsidizing plans. In
Pittinger, the Court allowed textbooks to be loaned to non-public
schools, as previously permitted," 5 but refused to allow the state to
provide instructional materials and equipment or auxiliary services
by public school personnel."'
Although reasonable accommodation violations involve a differ-
ent type of scrutiny than required in education cases, an impermis-
sible and inevitable entanglement problem remains. Under Title
VII, an individual may take a grievance to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission"7 (EEOC) and also may file a court ac-
tion."8 While entanglement in this area does not involve a religious
institution per se, the investigations require inspection of work
schedules allegedly disfavoring particular religions. This is done
without focusing on a business necessity test or on overt discrimina-
tion."9
The 1972 amendment provides that the employer must observe
"all aspects of religious observances, practice and belief."'2 0 As such,
the provision is so far-reaching as to be ambiguous. Religious beliefs
have been judicially defined as "sincere and meaningful feelings
which occupy in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by. . God."'' The definition has been broadened to include moral
and ethical beliefs as well.' 22 However, although religion may have
some definition, the scope of the qualifying term "all aspects of
observance, practice, and belief"' is unclear. Congress did not indi-
112. Id.
113. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
114. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
115. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
116. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975). It was feared that items such as projectors
and the like could too easily be converted to use for sectarian purposes. To guarantee that
this would not occur would entail an enormous amount of examination by some government
agency. Such a burden would be intolerable.
1,17. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(5) (Supp. IV 1974).
118. Id. See, e.g., Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Cummins
v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
119. See text accompanying notes 56-64 supra.
120. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(j) (Supp. IV 1974).
121. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
122. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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cate how broadly the term was to be interpreted, nor did it indicate
whether the definition of religion delimited in United States v.
Seeger'23 and Welsh v. United States2 ' was applicable to employ-
ment discrimination cases.
Intentional discrimination can take one of two forms: (1) obvious
and wilful discrimination, such as refusal to hire Jews or Catholics
simply because they are Jews or Catholics; or (2) overtly neutral
practices that are intentionally designed to affect disparately em-
ployees holding certain religious beliefs.' 2 Both types of intentional
discrimination are prohibited under Title VII,126 but discerning dis-
crimination in the latter category can be a difficult and time-
consuming process. To facilitate religious discrimination cases,
while also protecting legitimate discriminatory practices, it has
been proposed that a broad but malleable definition of religion be
employed.2 7 Discrimination, on the other hand, should be construed
narrowly thus avoiding undue burdens on employers while allowing
for a wide range of religious beliefs. 12 Only by construing religion
and discrimination in this way can the problem be well covered
without overtaxing either employer or employee.
Admittedly, problems inherent in proving subjective discrimina-
tory intent in employment practices make this theory difficult to
effectuate, 9 but the alternative is to overburden courts and the
EEOC with claims of employees, especially where an individual
does not get satisfaction through his chosen forum.
The result of this ambiguity would necessitate extensive review
before the EEOC and federal courts. Both forums would be required
to interpret the statute, perhaps inconsistently, or at least in such
a variety of circumstances as to be extremely burdensome. 3 Incon-
sistent or overreaching determinations concerning the extent of pro-
per religious practices and observances is directly contrary to the
desire of the Court to weed out spurious claims. 3'
Because of the overlap in litigation, and the potential for incon-
sistent and recurring litigation before the courts and government
agencies, the reasonable accommodation clause of Title VII causes
123. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
124. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
125. Edwards and Kaplan, note 8 supra, at 619.
126. Id. See also remarks of Senator Humphrey, note 8 supra.
127. Edwards and Kaplan, note 8 supra, at 619.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Blumrosen, note 8 supra.
130. See, e.g., Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975).
131. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
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excessive government entanglement with religion. Consequently,
the provision fails the third test in establishment clause criteria.
WHEN ACCOMMODATION BECOMES UNREASONABLE
The opportunity to decide the constitutionality of the reasonable
accommodation clause has been presented to the Court on three
occasions in recent years. In Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.'32 and
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. 31 the Court did not render an opinion
on the constitutional merits. The effect of these decisions was incon-
clusive on the question of the statute, since the Sixth Circuit
reached different results in each case. 134
The most recent opportunity for the Court to address the issue
was Trans World Airlines v. Hardison. 3 - In Hardison the glaring
impropriety of the amendment and concurrent potential for abuse
of first amendment privileges was clearly manifested. The Court
finally issued an opinion on the reasonable accommodation claim of
an employer, but both Justice White, speaking for the majority,'
and Justice Marshall in dissent, 37 stated that the decision was not
based on first amendment grounds. That portion of the appeal was
left unanswered. 3 8 The Court only decided whether an employer
was required to breach a collective bargaining agreement in order
to accommodate the religious beliefs of an employee. 39
The Court of Appeals held that TWA could have breached its
agreement with Hardison's union and must do so in order to make
a reasonable accommodation.'10 The court also rejected TWA's con-
tention that the employee had placed himself in the predicament
by voluntarily transferring shifts, even though cognizant that he
132. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
133. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
134. An explanation for the discrepancies could be that Dewey was decided under the old
guidelines while Cummins was decided after the 1967 guidelines were effected. As the Court
pointed out in Hardison, neither of these cases can be given much precedential value since
each caused an equal split of the Court. 97 S. Ct. at 2271 n.8.
135. 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977).
136. Id. at 2269.
137. Id. at 2279-80 n.3.
138. The majority twice intimated limitations of the establishment clause with regards
to Title VII. At 97 S. Ct. 2275-76, Justice White states that Title VII does not require an
employer to violate a contract with a union in order to accommodate an employee's beliefs.
Justice White also noted the inherent fairness of a proper seniority system and again referred
to first amendment restrictions by proclaiming that a seniority system which takes root in
the religious preferences of employees would also be violative of the Constitution. Id. at 2274,
2277. Justice Marshall dismissed the constitutional problem by deciding that neither party
was concerned with the issue. Id. at 2280 n.4.
139. Id. at 2276.
140. See id. at 2273-77.
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would irretrievably lose his seniority rights by doing so. The court
stated that "before an employer can assert the defense of non-
cooperation, it is incumbent upon it to establish the accommodation
which it has tendered and with which the employee has refused to
cooperate."' 4 ' Furthermore, "to limit an employee's right of transfer
within the company as a condition of accommodation would be to
discriminate against him with respect to his . . . conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of his . . . religion."'' 2
The Eighth Circuit's decision permitted an employee to escape
the unfavorable consequences generated by his voluntary creation
of a situation necessitating a choice between his religious beliefs and
employment. This notion is repulsive to the first amendment and
should not be tolerated.
In reversing the appellate court, the Supreme Court emphasized
the role of the collective bargaining agreement in force between
TWA and Hardison's union.' Paying homage to the purpose of the
Act as expressed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., "' the Court refused
to go further than to declare that TWA had attempted a reasonable
accommodation within the meaning of the statute and was not re-
quired to violate its agreement with the union.
CONCLUSION
While Hardison admittedly limits the scope of the 1972 amend-
ment, the Court circumvented the most pressing issue before it-
whether the reasonable accommodation requirement is constitu-
tional at all. The intimation of the Court is that first amendment
considerations need not be examined until the law is construed to
force the employer or employee to assume significant costs in the
attempted accommodation.' If so, the ramifications of the require-
ments under Title VII and first amendment criteria may have been
ignored or misapplied. The prayer reading cases indicate that it is
not necessary that monetary contributions to religions, either direct
or indirect, be present in order to trigger establishment clause
scrutiny.'46
141. See note 100 supra.
142. 527 F.2d at 39. The Eighth Circuit also proposed alternatives which had not been
suggested by the parties nor the district court, 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974), which
bordered or transcended the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court rejected
all of these out of hand as constituting an undue hardship. 97 S. Ct. 2272-77.
143. This was the same position taken by the Sixth Circuit in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
144. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
145. 97 S. Ct. at 2279-80 nn. 3 & 4 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. See notes 79-83 supra and accompanying text.
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Madison's warning of "three pence . . . for the support of any
[religious] establishment" '47 should not be read literally as being
the only time to invoke constitutional examination. Hopefully, the
Court will accept the next opportunity to examine the purpose and
effect of the reasonable accommodation clause and squarely face the
constitutional questions presented.
When these questions are answered, it is believed that the Court
will find that the purpose of the 1972 amendment was to foster
attendance at Sabbatarian services, thus aiding those religions; that
the primary effect of the amendment is directly beneficial to those
same religions; and that claims involving religious discrimination
are becoming more complex and more remote from the original
purposes of the Act. Thus, it is suggested that the reasonable ac-
commodation clause be declared violative of the first amendment
at the earliest opportunity.
BRENDAN M. COURNANE
147. 330 U.S. at 65-66. The entire Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments appears at the end of Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 63 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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